MLB teams handed out 20 qualifying offers following the 2015 season. Astros outfielder Colby Rasmus became the first player ever to accept the one-year, $15.8 million deal. Dodgers starter Brett Anderson and Orioles catcher Matt Wieters soon followed suit.
However, 16 of those free agents rejected the offer and three of them still remain unsigned heading into the 2016 season: outfielder Dexter Fowler, shortstop Ian Desmond and starter Yovani Gallardo - all of whom are worthy of multi-year contracts. (Marco Estrada was given the qualifying offer, but he eventually agreed to a two-year contract with the Toronto Blue Jays.)
Is the qualifying offer system flawed? And if so, how can it be fixed?
Everything has its flaws, but the QO system is particularly more flawed than not due to those it actually affects: the players and small market teams.
Talented players such as Fowler, Desmond and Gallardo remain unsigned because many MLB clubs - particularly the small market ones - are hesitant to surrender their first-round draft choice since they rely on such picks to stay competitive in future seasons.
FOX Sports' Ken Rosenthal recently talked about how the Cleveland Indians should sign Dexter Fowler and the Tampa Bay Rays should sign Ian Desmond, but both clubs have the No. 13 and 15 overall picks in the 2016 MLB Draft and are reluctant to give up such value.
Same goes for the Baltimore Orioles, who keep contemplating whether or not to sign Gallardo and surrender the No. 14 overall pick. The O's have one of the worst rotations in the MLB as well as one of the weakest farm systems, so it's really a toss up for them.
"The draft, which supposedly is designed to enhance competitive balance, sometimes does just the opposite," Rosenthal wrote. "Low-revenue teams are tired of the inequities throughout the game's economic system. High-revenue teams are tired of subsidizing low-revenue teams that spend too little on baseball operations."
"Is it fair that low-revenue teams must sacrifice a pick to sign a free agent who received a qualifying offer, when merely coming up with the money for such a player is challenging enough for those clubs?"
"Successful high-revenue teams hold a different kind of edge -- the ability to sign multiple free agents who received qualifying offers at the cost of lesser picks."
The Cubs are a perfect example of Rosenthal's last point. Chicago was set to pick at the bottom of the first round of the upcoming MLB Draft, and, as a result, had no issue surrendering two draft picks when they signed John Lackey and Jason Heyward away from the St. Louis Cardinals.
The new CBA negotiations should (and probably will) focus on the QO system. The MLB and MLBPA should consider making overarching amendments to it if they want to keep it around. Here are a few they can discuss:
- Allowing teams to only present the qualifying offer to players who have been under contract with that club for at least two years
- Protecting the first 15 picks in the MLB Draft rather than just the first 10 (or protect the picks of non-playoff teams only)
- Extending the deadline for those mulling whether or not to accept the offer and provide a salary increase based on service time/their performance from the year prior (almost like another year of arbitration)
Let's elaborate on each point.
For the first proposition, this would limit the amount of players presented with the QO each year. Two years under contract with the same team is at least a somewhat reasonable tenure as opposed to one.
Fowler and Gallardo are two players who were acquired in a trade before the 2015 season, and simply because they were with the Cubs and Rangers for the full year, those teams get the luxury of offering them the QO to potentially receive a first-round draft choice (and at the same time hurting the players' value, which could beenfit that team in its efforts to re-sign them).
I don't know about you, but this doesn't make much sense. Maintaining a player for merely one year should not dictate how a team affects that player's free agency. (In this case, it's both Fowler's and Gallardo's first year of free agency, which makes it an even more glaring issue because it's the first time they're eligible for lucrative long-term deals.)
Desmond's qualifying offer case at least makes sense. He's been with the Nationals for his entire career and the team even reportedly offered him a $107 million extension two years ago, which he declined. As a result, Washington should have the right to get value for the veteran, since he's a homegrown player and the team attempted to retain him long-term.
If this rule was in place for this offseason, we would have seen just 12 players receive the offer.
For the second proposition, protecting more picks will broaden the umbrella of security for teams that can't afford to lose their selections. For example, the Indians, Rays and Orioles are three middle-of-the-road teams with (for the most part) weak spending power (although the O's went outside of their normal budget this offseason).
In contrast, the Detroit Tigers, a big market team, had an awful campaign in 2015, but they were the AL Central champs the previous four seasons, reaching the ALCS three times and the World Series once. They gained a protected pick (No. 9 overall) for their troubles last season despite having one of the most talented rosters in the MLB. They waved the white flag at the trade deadline when they sent David Price and Yoenis Cespedes packing.
On the other hand, both the Rays and Indians scraped by and hovered around .500 as they attempted to compete for a playoff spot down the stretch, which ended up presenting a disadvantage in their free agent endeavors since they're reportedly interested in signing players that rejected the qualifying offer.
The Tigers used their protected pick to their advantage and signed starter Jordan Zimmermann.
And the owners have the audacity to worry about tanking when the current system encourages it?
And last but not least, the final proposition is perhaps the most important. Players presented with the QO have seven days to accept it. Seven days (for some) to decide the future of their career and to predict how the market will materialize throughout the long offseason is clearly not enough time. Others who were lucky enough to get traded in the middle of the season are not tied to draft pick compensation and thus have the luxury of waiting weeks or months to determine their plan.
Does that sound fair for a player who just spent (at least) six MLB seasons under a system that determines his salary?
Let's forget about players who are subject to the offer after being under club control for six years for a moment. In Gallardo's case, the right-hander signed a five-year extension (with a team option for a sixth season) with the Milwaukee Brewers at the onset of the 2010 season. The option contract called for a $13 million salary and a $1 million bonus in the event he was traded, which he was. In the end, the Rangers got to offer him a paltry $1.8 million raise for the 2016 season after he endured a career-year.
Yes, the extension was certainly favorable for Gallardo as a 24-year-old, but he wasn't guaranteed that sixth season and now he remains unemployed after one of the best campaigns of his nine-year career.
Perhaps the MLB and MLBPA can discuss escalating salaries for the qualifying offers as well so the one-year deal will be reflective of a fair raise based on service time and/or their campaign the season prior.
Who knows. Right now the system just isn't right. This time around it benefitted players who made significantly less money the season prior and put those who should be making more money at risk for signing a deal they perhaps deserve.
Rasmus, Wieters and Anderson accepted the QO this offseason and will each make $15.8 million in 2016. Rasmus earned $8 million in 2015, Wieters earned $8.3 million and Anderson earned $10 million. And all were not without their inconsistencies/flaws: In 2015 Rasmus played in over 118 games for the first time since 2012; Wieters logged just 101 games in the previous two seasons (75 in 2015) due to Tommy John surgery; and Anderson made at least 30 starts for the first time since 2009 (he appeared in just 62 games between 2010 and 2014).
On the other hand, Gallardo raked in $14 million and had a career year (3.42 ERA in 33 starts); Fowler earned $9.5 million, also had a career campaign (149 hits, 102 runs scored and 17 home runs were career-highs) and continued to display consistent offensive production; and Desmond, despite having arguably the worst season of his career, made $11 million and is still regarded as one of the best offensive shortstops in the game having hit at least 19 home runs in each of the past four seasons (his career stats are also much more balanced than those who accepted the QO and got large raises for 2016).
Additionally, Howie Kendrick, who rejected the Dodgers QO and signed a two-year, $20 million deal with Los Angeles once his options were exhausted, has a career stat line of .293/.333/.423 and is regarded as one of the best offensive second basemen in the MLB. He made $9.5 million in 2015, and, because he was subjected to the QO, many teams backed off of the idea of signing him, most notably the Arizona Diamondbacks. His $10 million salary in 2016 is a $500,000 raise from 2015.
Here's what he had to say about the whole ordeal.
This offseason marked the first time ever a player accepted the qualifying offer and it really helped expose further flaws with the system. And, now that it has finally been accepted, it's crazy to think MLB clubs can present those same players with the qualifying offer again next offseason unless a change is made.
